This paper examines the forward premium puzzle based on 1-week forward rates across weekdays. The paper finds that Thursday consistently appears to be a special day on which the puzzle disappears, while it is present on other weekdays. In addition to Thursday, Monday is also found to be a similar special day for the Euro. The paper proposes that this Thursday effect (Monday effect for Euro) is caused by monetary announcements released constantly on Tuesday (Thursday) by the FOMC (the European Central Bank). The empirical tests provide convincing evidence in favor of the proposed explanation.
Introduction
One of the most extensively examined topics in international finance has been the efficiency of forward market for foreign exchange. From early studies such as Fama (1984) , to more recent ones such as Meredith and Ma (2002) , an enormous number of studies have shown the failure of forward exchange rate to serve as an unbiased predictor of future spot rate. In literature, the robustness of the puzzle has been tested in multiple aspects, including different time periods (e.g. Zhou and Kutan (2005) ), different countries (e.g. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) ), different maturities (e.g. Chinn and Meredith (2004) ), etc. This paper inspects the puzzle from a new angle-different weekdays. It is noticeable that the studies using forward rates with 1-week maturity usually take the observations on a particular weekday as the representative of that week, but no papers seem to concern if different weekday would generate inconsistent results. This paper adds to the literature by examining the day-of-the-week effect in the relationship between current forward rate and future spot rate.
The paper first tests the forward premium puzzle by using 1-week forward rates across weekdays. The results are interesting yet intriguing: there does exist an inconsistency across weekdays. Specifically, for all currencies, Thursday consistently appears to be a special day on which the puzzle disappears, while it is present on other weekdays. In addition, for Euro, Monday is also found to be a similar special day. These empirical findings, which have not been reported in literature before, can be called the Thursday effect of forward premium puzzle 1 . The further robust test shows that the effect is significant only when the span of sample period is long enough.
The paper attributes the effect to the monetary policy announcements made by the Federal Open Market Committee (the similar monetary policy committee in the European Central Bank)
constantly on Tuesdays (Thursdays). The paper argues that the market expectation about future spot rate is dominantly affected by such fundamental information so that expectation error can be reduced and the future spot rate follows the relationship implied by the theory in the week when the information is released. Due to the delivery arrangement that the orders will be settled two business days after the transaction date in both the money market and foreign exchange market, when the information is released on Tuesday (Thursday in the European case), the arbitrage transactions conducted by the investors who want to speculate on the information will be completed two business days later, i.e. Thursday (Monday for Euro). Thus the relationship between future spot rate and current forward rate on Thursdays (Monday for Euro) is closer to the scenario described by the theory, and the puzzle seems to disappear on Thursdays (and also
Monday for Euro). But since the FOMC does not meet every week (about eight times a year and once one month in the European case), the effect emerges only when the sample period is long enough. The empirical tests provide evidence supporting such an explanation.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, it provides new empirical evidence that deepens the forward premium puzzle. This evidence shows that the forward premium puzzle depends on the day of the week. Second, the paper proposes an explanation that has solid intuitive foundation. As summarized in Engle (1996) , the explanations for the puzzle basically can be divided into two categories --time varying risk premium and irrational expectations. And the findings in this paper tend to support the second category. The paper is also related to the literature of exchange rate dynamics. A lot of studies show that there is a lack of connection between spot rate and macroeconomic variables, but as shown in Simpson et. al (2005) , the spot rate does respond to fundamental shocks such as the announcements of interest rate. The findings in the paper are consistent with such stylized facts.
The rest of the paper is structured as below: section 2 reports the new empirical evidences about the forward premium puzzle, section 3 proposes an explanation, section 4 tests the tentative explanation and section 5 concludes.
Empirical findings
The data employed in this paper were extracted from DataStream and contain dollar rates for several major currencies, including the Canadian Dollar (CAD), Euro (EUR) and Japanese Yen (JPY). Both spot and 1-week forward exchange rates were collected on a daily basis for each of these currencies. The CAD and JPY data cover the period between 10/27/1997 and 11 
As argued by Breuer (1996) , whether or not the settlement date of the forward contract matches the settlement date of future spot trading should be examined for the test. In our case, since we are using forward contracts with 1-week maturity, the question is whether or not the future spot rate in equation (1) should be exactly 7 days ahead of the current spot rate. According to Grabbe (1995) , to determine the one week forward settlement date for forward trading that takes place today, first determine the spot settlement date, and then the same day of the next week is the settlement date of the forward contract. For example, for a EUR/ USD 1-week forward contract entered into on Monday, the spot settlement date will be two business days after 2 (i.e.
Wednesday), and thus the delivery date of the forward contract should be next Wednesday. To speculate on this contract, a speculator should trade currency in the spot market next Monday, with the delivery date being next Wednesday. Due to this intuitional arrangement, the forward rate on any day of the week is associated with the spot rate exactly one week later. Therefore the future spot rate used in the test should be the spot rate exactly one week after the transaction date.
2 Spot settlement date is two business days after the transaction date except for Canadian dollar and Mexican Peso against U.S. dollars in North America.
Thus, by construction, 1-week forward rates are regressed with weekly spot returns.
Therefore the frequency of the data and maturity of the contracts do not overlap in the estimation, and serial correlation of error items can be ignored here. However, it is well known that spot returns have time-varying volatility in the second conditional moments. To avoid the inefficiency of the estimation caused by heteroscadicity, the Newey-West estimator for the standard errors is applied in the estimation. To test the robustness of the finding across various subperiods within the entire data period, a rolling regression was applied for each weekday. In the regressions, a window is chosen that is shorter than the entire data coverage. Beginning at the first instance of this window, equation (1) is used to regress the data within the window and obtain one result. Then, moving the window one position forward and regressing the data in the next window generates another result. This process continues until the bottom of the window reaches the end of the data. Thus, multiple estimates can be obtained for each weekday to determine whether the new finding is consistent 3 The rest of the paper will argue and show that both the Thursday effect across the currencies and Euro's Monday effect are caused by the similar reasons, and the latter is actually a European version of the Thursday effect. As we can see from the last column of the figures, in a long window period (6-year for CAD and JPY, 5-year for EUR), the betas on Thursdays fall in a narrow interval between -0.5 to 0.5, while the results on other weekdays are significantly negative (-3 to -5 for CAD, -4 to -6 for EUR, -1 to -2 for JPY). In contrast, in shorter window periods (left two columns of the figure), the betas are mostly distributed around zero and the differences between Thursday's distribution and other weekdays' are not clearly identifiable. In addition to Thursday, Monday also appears to be a special day for Euro. On that day, the majority of betas are clustered around 0 rather than some significant negative numbers in the long window period, and such an inconsistency can not be seen either in shorter window periods. Therefore, two conclusions can be drawn from these figures. First, the Thursday (Monday) effect is robust across subperiods; second, the effect emerges only when the estimation period is long enough.
In summary, the new findings about the puzzle discovered by the paper are: 1) Thursdays generate different results than other weekdays across currencies. 2) Mondays behave similarly for the Euro, 3) the Thursday and Monday effect do not show up until the window period is long enough.
Explanations
The proposed explanation in this paper arises from the effort to answer the key question:
under what condition can beta be close to zero 4 . I derived the condition based on a simple factor model of exchange rate that follows Backus et. al.(2001) . In this model, the forward premium, according to CIP 5 , equals interest rate differential. i.e., α are constant coefficients, thus domestic and foreign interest rates can be written as:
Only two common factors are included in this setup because of the following reasons. First, Ding (2007) found that two common factors would account for almost all variation of the interest rate explained by the common factors; Second, intuitively there are two types of information in the market: fundamental and non-fundamental information, which can be represented by the two factors respectively; Third, according to Baillie and Bollerslev (1994) , both properties of high persistency and random walk can be found in the forward premium. Usually, fundamental information such as macroeconomic variable is highly persistent and pretty stable, while nonfundamental information is independent across time and much more volatile. So this setup can also accommodate the statistical features of the forward premium.
Without losing generality, I assume that t z , 1 represents fundamental information and t z , 2 reflects the non-fundamental information. An interest rate differential can be obtained from
equations (3) and (4):
Therefore, forward premium can be written as,
The future spot exchange rate is structured as forward rate plus risk premium, i. 
Subtracting current spot rate on the both sides of equation (7) results in:
Thus, based on equation (6) and (9), the OLS estimated slope coefficient of equation (1) can be expressed as:
which can be rewritten as: 
Since the non-fundamental variable is believed to be much more volatile than the fundamental one, so the ratio of two variances can be ignored. Then, the slope coefficient can be simplified as:
According to the equation above, the zero beta suggests: which can be rewritten as:
Plugging this relationship into equation (9), the expected future spot exchange rate can be expressed as:
In the equation above, non-fundamental information is canceled out, which suggests that if expected spot exchange rate change depends mainly on fundamental information, then the beta tends to be zero.
Meanwhile, an important institutional factor has to be considered. Equation (1) is derived from CIP and UIP, while both CIP and UIP are based on the no-arbitrage condition. Recall the arbitrage process for the CIP condition by using a 1-week forward contract. First, borrow domestic currency in the money market. Second, buy foreign currency in the spot market. Third, deposit foreign currency to earn interest and fourth sell the foreign currency at the rate specified in the forward contract (sell the foreign currency in the spot market for UIP) one week later.
According to Grabbe (1995) , the delivery date of short-term money market instruments is two business days after the transaction date. Suppose a speculator observes information and decides to speculate on it on weekday T (T could be any number from 1 through 5). The money will be delivered to his account on weekday T+2 (2 means two business days), and then he can start It is this scenario which I propose as the explanation of the Thursday Effect.
For the Euro, in addition to Thursday, Monday also possesses similar properties as Thursdays. According to our logic, we expect to see that some fundamental information such as monetary policy announcements is released constantly two business days before Monday, i.e.
Thursday. The fact is that the monetary policy committee in the European Central Bank does meet and announce the base interest rate mostly on Thursday, as shown in table 5. So our proposed explanation can also explain the Monday effect for the Euro.
This logic can also explain why this effect only shows up in long window periods: not every Thursday has an announcement. The FOMC meets about eight times a year, and about once a month for its counterpart in the European Central Bank. Therefore, the effect is not significant enough to emerge in a relatively short window period, as it contains fewer observations of the announcement weeks.
As for other central banks, the monetary policy committee in the Bank of Canada also meets on Tuesdays with the same frequency as the FOMC. So the effect of their monetary policy announcement should be mixed with that of FOMC and does not cause a different day-of-theweek effect. The meeting date of the similar committee in the Bank of Japan is fairly random and not fixed at one specific weekday. Thus, the Japanese monetary announcement does not cause a different day-of-the-week effect either.
The proposed explanation argues that when monetary policy announcements are made, as opposed to non-fundamental information (usually private information), market participants consider the news as common knowledge and have similar interpretations of the news. Therefore, irrational expectation behavior will be reduced in the foreign exchange market. In this sense, our explanation fits in the literature that attributes the puzzle to irrational expectations or expectation errors.
Empirical tests
The proposed explanation has two components: the FOMC's (the European Central Bank) monetary announcement is the direct cause of the Thursday effect (Monday effect for Euro), and the transmission mechanism is that people expect future spot rate mainly based on the fundamental information in the announcement weeks. These two aspects can be used to test the proposed explanation.
A natural way to test the first component is to compare the betas obtained with and without observations in announcement weeks. The logic of the test is simple: if the effect is caused by the announcements, then the sample without the observations of the announcement weeks should generate a beta consistent with other weekdays. Accordingly, I estimated equation (1) Finally, we test the second component of the explanation. If our proposed mechanism of the Thursday effect is correct, the spot rate should respond significantly to changes in the effective federal fund rate in the announcement weeks, but not in other weeks. A simple way to test this would be to regress spot rate return on the federal fund rate along with a dummy variable indicating the announcement weeks. However, since it is very likely that market participants interpret the information in a nonlinear way, such a linear (or even quadratic test) may not be conclusive. To avoid the complication of specifying the specific relationship between these two variables, I used a sign test proposed by Campbell and Dufour (1995) to detect the response of exchange rates to the monetary announcement. b and is independent of t g , Campbell and Dufour (1995, proposition 1) show that
has an exact binomial finite sample distribution with n trials and a probability of success equal to 0.5.
To apply the sign test in our case, let should have an exact binomial finite sample distribution with n trials and a probability of success equal to 0.5, which can be verified by a standard proportional t-test. If the interest rate does have a significant impact, then a higher federal fund rate reduces the interest rate differential (foreign minus domestic interest rate), and according to UIP, should cause the domestic currency to depreciate (i.e spot return should be higher). Therefore, if the spot rate responds significantly to the announcements, the ratio should be significantly less than 0.5.
The interest rates used in the test were downloaded from the website of St. Louis Fed and the central banks of the foreign countries. The spot returns came from the DataStream. Table 3 reports the results of this sign test. The ratio in the table is calculated as 
Conclusions.
This article tests the unbiasedness hypothesis of forward rates across weekdays and finds that the puzzle seems to disappear on Thursdays across currencies (Monday for Euro as well). More specifically, instead of being significant negative number, the beta is statistically equal to zero on the special weekdays. Furthermore, the paper finds that this phenomenon only emerges when the window period is long enough. This new empirical finding can be referred to the Thursday Effect of the forward premium puzzle.
The paper proposes an explanation based on a simple factor model of exchange rates. According to the model, the beta being zero suggests that expected future spot rate depends on fundamental information dominantly. Hence the paper argues that when U.S. monetary policy announcements are released regularly on Tuesdays, the speculators would mainly focus on this fundamental information forming their expectations of the future spot rate. Meanwhile, due to the delivery arrangement that the orders will be settled two business days after the transaction date in both the money market and foreign exchange market, the arbitrage transactions conducted by the speculators will be completed two business days later, i.e. Thursday (Monday for Euro). Thus the relationship between future spot rate and current forward rate is closer to the scenario described by the theory on Thursdays (Monday for Euro). Similarly, the Monday effect for Euro can be attributed to European Central Bank's regular release of monetary policy information on Thursdays, which are two working days ahead of Mondays. Empirical test of the paper support the proposed explanation.
The paper identifies a calendar effect in the foreign exchange market. So for future research, whether a trading strategy can be designed based on this market inefficiency should be evaluated. And also, since the paper suggests that the spot rate responds to the fundamental information such as the announcement of interest rates, the ability of these fundamental variables to forecast future spot rate in these special weeks should be examined. 
over the size of each sample. Numbers in the parentheses are the t-statistics of the ratio test. Null hypothesis is the ratio equal 0.5. The test is conducted by two samples for each currency, including the observations in weeks with and without the announcements respectively. 
